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From The Soviet Union to Russia:
Changing Labor Conditions

Charles Hawkins

•
Russia's government began endorsing the principles of free-market capitalism
in late 1991. The switch implied a realization of the inherent difficulties that
the previous communist system presented for the economic well-being of the
nation. Increasingly, the new economic ideology, which still faces strong opposition from co nservative elements in the government, is be ing i_m plemented
throughout the country by th e workers themselves. Ironically, the 1917 communist revolution for the proletariat is being carried out according to the
actual wishes of the workers almost seventy-five years later. To illuminate the
effects of this "revolution," Russia's economic conditions before the breakdown of the Soviet system will be contrasted with the present movement
unfurling. Specifically the issues oflabor unions, unemployme nt, and worker
motivation will be examined.
SOVIET LABOR UN IONS UNL IKE UNIONS IN THE WEST

Prior to the revamping of the economy in 1991, a stringent communist scheme
existed in the Soviet Union. During the summer of 1917 the communists encouraged trade unions as the voice of the workers. Lenin then used the unions
to displace the provisional government that had been set up after Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917.
After the revolution, the unions were expected to support the government
since it was, in theory, a government for the workers. According to the Bolshevik Party line, independent labor unions would be redundant (McConnell
and Brue 1989, p. 590). Therefore, the unions became subservient to the state
and its objectives. The unions' role became vastly different from th e role of
unions in the capitalist world. Unions could not negotiate to obtain higher
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wage s, shorter h ours, o r b e tte r fr inge b e nefits for th e wo rke rs, since these factors were fixed by law (McConnell and Brue 1989, p . 591 ) . They were , howeve r,
e xpe cted to protect workers and the State from illegal activities by plant
managers (McConnell and Brue 1989, p. 591) .
Another tool used by unions in the West, the strike, was forbidden in the
Soviet Union. Strikes or any other work stoppages were seen as the workers
fighting themselves. Therefore, they were considered counterproductive
(Schapiro and Godson 1981, p. 109). This conclusion derived from the
theory that the interests of management and workers were complementary, not
antagonistic. Also, whereas in the West many labor union leaders became
political figures, in the Soviet Union, one had to be a high party official to
become a union leader (Schapiro and Godson 1981, p. 111). This enhanced
the influence of the party even further.
ZERO UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION?

Officially, unemployment did not exist in the Soviet Union after 1930 and no
documentation has been kept on the phenomenon. Western economists agree
that cyclical unemployment virtually disappeared through the use of economic
planning. Instead , the five-year plans, begun under Stalin, induced labor
shortages, generating a high level of frictional unemployment. Frictional
unemployment, which occurs when people quit their jobs and search for new
employment, grew because Soviet workers kept searching for better jobs.
Labor shortages provided opportunities for Soviet workers to seek better work
conditions and pay without much danger of permanent unemployment.
McConnell and Brue estimate that in the early 1980s twenty percent of Soviet
industrial workers annually quit their jobs-a turnover rate five times that of
the United States ( 1989, p. 594). The resulting loss in nominal GNP, caused by
the cost of retraining workers and the large number of workers between jobs,
crippled the economy. While some forms of unemployment were minimal
under the Soviet regime, the claim of zero unemployment failed to portray
accurately the real condition of the Soviet labor market.
SOVIE T WORKER MOTIVATION

The problem of worker motivation is complex. While frictional unemployment lowered potential GNP, Soviet GNP did increase over th_e years. The rise
was caused by growth in labor force participation (the percentage of people
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over age 16 working) rather than productivity growth , which hardl y existed
(McConnell and Brue 1989, p. 595). Many reasons lie b e hind the stagnation
in productivity, such as deficiencies in the planning system, wage schedules,
and worker attitudes.
As might be guessed , the Soviet system of central planning did not allow or
encourage innovation or change . In addition, the system of input supply was
unreliable. Often firms could not work at full capacity because they had not
received the necessary supplies from another firm. This resulted in hoarding
and inefficiency. Many managers hoarded supplies to ensure they would not
be short in the future.
The same problem occurred with labor as well. The shortage oflabor caused
many managers to keep people in inefficient positions just in case of emergency. A practice called "storming" arose from labor hoarding, contributing
to the inefficiency. Storming occurs when most of a factory's production takes
place near the end of a production period (McConnell and Brue 1989, p. 592).
Workers were generally idle at the beginning of the period . ( recovering from
the hard labor at the end of the previous period); then they were worked
overtime near the end to achieve the necessary quota set by the state ( 1989, p.
592). Storming lowers productivity due to the strain placed on the machines
and the workers, and it lowers product quality as well.
Wages in the Soviet Union were determined from a base rate set for the
average worker plus bonuses. Bonuses were given for production above the
quota and in specific work environments (e.g., coal mining). The bonuses
would appear to be a motivating element for the workers to increase production. The workers, however, knew that if they overproduced, quotas would be
raised, increasing their required workload.
Much of the workers ' fear arose from the Stakhanovite movement that
began in 1935. A coal miner named Andrei Stakhanov, with help from his
fellow workers, exceeded his production quota almost three fold. Soviet authorities seized the opportunity to increase the quota level, stating that
Stakhanov's production was fourteen times the quota amount. Each miner's
quota was then raised. This so-called Stakhanovite movement spread to other
industries as Soviet authorities began fabricating more spectacular feats.
Workers resented the Stakhanovites (as overproducing workers were called)
and many Stakhanovites found their lives shortened because of their fame. As
a result, most workers only produced to the quota level or a little beyond.
Nevertheless, the government believed that it was every citizen's duty to
work to improve society. This explains the high level of female participation
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in the labor forc e . Problems appeared, however, wh e n th e gove rnment's ideals were not matched by the workers. In reality, the workers did not have the
incentive to work that Western workers have. Since few of the production facilities made consumer goods, a small consumer product market resulted and
workers had little to buy with their money (McConnell and Brue 1989, p. 599).
The lack of incentive resulted in a high absentee rate, alcoholism, and few
hours on the job actually spent doing work. The Soviet government devised
many strategies to combat these problems. During Stalin's reign three late
arrivals at work could result in a six-month prison term. In 1983, Andropov had
absentee workers arrested (Business Week 1983, p . 56). None of these actions
eliminated the problem, however, and worker motivation remained low.
THE NEW RUSSIA

Following the coup attempt against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated surprisingly quickly. Republic
presidents, led by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, gained greater powers and
began to call for Gorbachev to step down. Gorbachev did so in December 1991,
in effect, splintering the Soviet Union into fifteen countries-one for each
republic of the Soviet Union. Throughout 1991, and especially after Gorbachev
resigned, a movement toward a free market economy grew rapidly. This
market growth has spurred marked differences in attitudes and programs
between the former Soviet Union and its largest republic, Russia. Labor unions
have taken an independent stance; unemployment is, unfortunately, flourishing; however, worker motivation is much higher than previously.
TRADE UNION INDEPENDENCE

The independence of the trade unions was guaranteed by the Law on Trade
Unions passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990. As Russia continues to
move toward free market conditions, this independence likely will remain and
could become more pronounced. The challenge for the trade unions is immense, says Mikhail Shmakov, the chairman of the Moscow Federation of Trade
Unions. Shmakov states that the purpose of unions is strictly economic now:
"Our main aim is to ensure that we are appropriately paid for our work" (Yashin
1991, p. 22). The task of raising wages is imperative since large increases in
prices have occurred. In the old Soviet system, the state paid low wages but
subsidized many goods and services. Now the subsidies are vanishing and
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workers n eed higher wages to maintain their standard of livin g .
The trade unions publicly support th e transition to a free market economy;
however, they privately retain some unre alistic demands. Shmakov wants the
government to pay benefits ( e.g., child care a nd medical care), protect citizens
against unemployment, and provide opportunities for workers to learn new
trades (Yashin 1991, p. 23). His ideas, however admirable , will be difficult for
the Russian government to implement with the current fiscal restraints being
imposed. The restraints are twofold. First, a tight monetary policy is being
implemented to lower inflation and to create a healthy national currency.
Second, government expe nditures are also being curtailed to lower inflation.
Shmakov also believes that the strike should become a weapon in the
unions' arsenal , to be used "only as a last resort" (Yashin 1991, p. 23). To allow for this possibility, Shmakov's union established a bank which would
support families and provide low-interest loans to workers if a strike would
become prolonged. Further, the union started a joint venture managing a hotel
with an Austrian company to provide additional capital (Yashin 1991, p. 23) .
This expanding independence of unions could create an atmosphere of increasing unrest. The difficulties of systemic change in Russia will certainly
create hardships for workers. If unions wish to improve each worker's standard of living, there could be strikes that would further cripple the stagnant
economy. This worker "weapon" should be wielded with considerable restraint.
ACKNOWLEDGING UNEMPLOYMENT

In 1985, after fifty-five years of denial , th e Soviet government officially recognized unemployment at 1.1 per cent or approximately 1.6 million people.
Actually, V. Busygin claims the level of unemployment in 1985 sat between 8.2
and 9 million people (1990, pp . 57-60). Today the Russian government is
beginning to accumulate and publish data on this subject, but no figures have
been available since the move to a free market economy.
The International Labor Organization, an agency of the United Nations,
expected Russian unemployment to rise to fifteen percent or eleven million
people by th e end of 1992. Unemployment figures as high as thirty million
people could be reached, the ILO contends, if Russia continues with plans to
raise oil prices to world levels and allow struggling state businesses to go
bankrupt (Rubinfien 1992, p. AlO).
Many economists believe that the level of unemployment will be much
higher than previous official levels. Guy Standing even suggests the transition
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to a market-based economy will not be successful without unemployment
striking fear into workers. This fear, Standing contends, would cause a rise in
both productivity and discipline ( 1991, p . 250). Whether or not unemployment will serve to motivate Russian workers is unknown. Still , they must
r e cognize the importance of improving their productivity and discipline.
Without substantial improvements in these areas, Russian businesses will find
it hard to compete in world markets.
MOTIVATING THE

RUSSIAN

WORKER

Once again , worker motivation is the most complex of the three issues .
Privatization of many factories and the establishment of free trade zones
around Russia have provided a monetary incentive to workers. Cooperatives,
a cross between a corporation and a partnership, have provided the incentive
of private ownership to many workers. The popularity of cooperatives is evident from the increase in their number from 3,700 in July 1987 to more than
200,000 three years later (Slider 1991, p. 799) . It is likely that cooperatives are
a stepping-stone to the Western-style corporation, since cooperatives contain
a growing pool of Russian entrepreneurs. When market conditions provide the
proper environment, these entrepreneurs will create corporations. The formation of corporations should allow Russians to accumulate enough capital for
further industrialization.
The most important changes have come with regard to the labor market itself. The former USSR Supreme Soviet passed laws in 1990 allowing firms to
establish their own wage rates, though the effectiveness of the acts was later
diminished by a tax-based income policy, which will be discussed shortly. Incentives for managers are also being set up to maximize long- run production,
curbing such problems as storming (Shcherbakov 1991, p. 235). The role of the
state is becoming focused on the protection of workers ' rights in the areas of
time off, working conditions, and the right to profit from one 's labor.
One problem could be arising, however. Russia seems to have inherited the
Soviet tax-based income policy (TIP). A TIP subjects any wage increase above
a government determined level to a large tax, thereby discouraging firms from
allowing high wages and workers from demanding them (Standing 1991, p.
251) . A lack of productivity growth could result. Non-wage forms of remun e ration (such as health, education, housing, pensions, and other benefits)
were used extensively in the Soviet Union and the TIP would further increase
th e ir use. The tax-based income policy would be destructive since higher
11
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wages, not non-wage remun eration , is the incentive workers are demanding .
Higher wages would promote hi g her productivity and an increase in the val ue
of la bor by the firm (Standing 1991 , p. 251).
WILL THE REFORMS R E MAI N?

During the past two ye ars the emerging Russi a n fre e market labor practices
have drastically altered the former Soviet Union's labor policy. The issues of
labor unions, unemployme nt, and worker motiva tion have been central to
many of the reforms . Each of these areas will be critical to the evolution of the
Russian economy and the survival of any Russian gover nment.
Labor unions are likely to grow increasingly inde pendent but will have to
avoid strikes which could further destabilize the fragile Russian e conomy.
Strike s would only decimate the already declining production levels, leaving
the workers no better off than before the strike . In addition, the unions may
have to forego government support in exchange for the new freedoms they are
acquiring. Essentially, the unions cannot be independent from the government and expect to receive full government support. Union members must
decide which is more important-freedom or support.
Unemployment is likely to increase dramatically through 1993. Privatization
of most production facilities, which is the next step the Yeltsin government is
planning for the Russian economy, will cause a reduction in employment. The
reduction will result from the layoff of idle workers that still exist and the shut
down of unprofitable state ventures. A high unemployment rate of twenty-five
percent could occur and the Yeltsin government will be hard pressed to
maintain support if such figures result.
Worker motivation is the primary goal of the Yeltsin government's switch
to a market economy. The freedom of prices that continued through 1992 and
the proposed privatization movement to commence in 1993 are efforts to place
the economy in the peoples' hands. Fighting the privatization movement is the
entrenched bureaucracy from the Soviet era. They fear the loss of power and
wealth that will result from a redistribution of capital and resources.
The success and degree of pain incurred in the transfer to a free-market
style economy will depend on these three issues. As the Yeltsin government
attempts to reform the economy, it will have to maintain the confidence of the
populace. So far President Yeltsin has remained popular despite the difficult
times, but concessions are presently being made to the more conservative elements of his government.
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At th e beginning of April, Yeltsin removed Yegor Gaidar, the man behind
the economic reforms, from his post as finance minis ter. While Russian governme n t so u rces claim th at Gaidar will retain overall co ntro l of the economy
from h is oth er position as d e p u ty prime min ister, h is removal m ay signal inter nal pressure o n Yeltsin .
Gaidar is a cr uc ial pl ayer in th e Russian re form s. On ly thirty -five, h e h as
provided the working plan o f Russia's free market visio n . In the West, his plans
have been hailed as the most b en eficial path for Russia; he h as also earn ed great
respe ct for his daring. Gaidar has parlayed this Western support into $24 billion
in pledge d aid for his countr y.
Without Gaidar, Yeltsin's reform plan will like ly crumbl e. Gaidar has been
a t the economic reform helm from the beginning . His knowledge of the
Russian system and how to accomplish his goals, despite severe opposition from
the bureaucracy, make him invaluable to Yeltsin. For the next few months the
influence Gaidar holds in economic policy should be a good barometer for
measuring how politically secure Yeltsin and his reform plan still remain.
The majority of Russians enthusiastically endorse the new freedoms they
have helped to create. It remains to be seen how stalwart their support will be
if unemployment and hardship grow during the coming years. Their continued support will depend on the recognition and acceptance of the difficulties
the movement to a free market economy will obviously encounter. Whether or
not the reforms will extend more freedoms to Russian businesses and workers
also depends on the Russian people. The battle over reforms is between the
privileged bureaucrats and the proletariat. But in contrast with the previous
Soviet ideology, the proletariat is now demanding free market capitalism, not
communism. To win the battle, the proletariat must be patient. Transformation
of an economy is a slow process.
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